Another argument for strong stimulus is that even the slow-paced recovery in payrolls described above represents an awfully lucky outcome, given the weakness of the acceleration in GDP growth since 2009, the last official recession year. The postrecession decrease in unemployment may represent nothing more than a one-time bounce back, a turn of events that owes its strength to the unusual severity of job losses during the recession itself (Bernanke 2012) . Hence, achieving a big improvement in the labor market may require far higher growth rates than those of the past few years. Appropriate stimulus, as we will suggest below, could take the form of any one of a number of different types of legislation, depending upon the mood of the country and the makeup of the next Congress.
Given the other factors that affect hiring, economic growth, and medium-term sustainability, a detailed analysis is needed to determine the level of stimulus required. In our last report (Papadimitriou, Hannsgen, and private sector demand increase, which can only come from a private-borrowing scenario, in which we find the appropriate amount of private sector net borrowing/lending to achieve the path of employment growth projected under current law by the Congressional Budget Office, in a report characterized by excessive optimism and a bias toward deficit reduction (CBO 2012) ; (2) a more plausible scenario, where we assume that most tax cuts are extended, and that household borrowing increases at a more reasonable rate; and (3) a fiscal stimulus scenario, in which we simulate the effects of a new, modestsize dose of public spending.
Some Slow-moving Forces Driving Economic Change
The global economy continues to be held back by a variety of factors. Here is a partial list of the more slow-moving, but fundamental, forces that figure in our understanding of the current economic situation, especially in the United States:
(1) Gradually escalating income disparities: those at the top of the economic pyramid now earn far more relative to the rest of us than they did in the 1950s, '60s, and '70s ( Figure   2 ). In 2010, this trend did not reverse itself. Average family income for the top 1 percent grew by 11.6 percent, while the bottom 99 percent experienced income gains of only onefifth of 1 percent (Saez 2012 Troubled European economies are now being forced to reduce their real production costs by cutting real wages. Their need to export goods and services in an inexpensive currency will keep world policymakers from encouraging a bidding up of the euro. Moreover, the Chinese currency has been appreciating for several years, but this process cannot be changed into a speedy one, given the policies of the Chinese government.
Hence, we cannot count on an increase in US exports over the next five years.
For this reason, attaining reasonable rates of employment growth will require greatly increased demand from the public sector, the private sector, or both. The discussion below of our three scenarios looks in detail at each of the ways the economy might reach higher growth rates of output and employment.
Scenario 1: GDP Gets Back to Potential under Current Law
As in most of our previous reports, in our first scenario we take the projected path for government receipts and outlays from the latest CBO (2012) (2012, 128) . The unemployment rate is expected to rise to 9.1 percent with the slowdown in economic activity, and to fall rapidly from 2014 onward, once the economy recovers.
In our first exercise, we assume the CBO path for fiscal Given net exports and fiscal policy, if the economy has to reach the growth rates projected by the CBO, the gap in demand can only be filled by an increase in domestic investment and consumption fuelled by borrowing. Therefore, in our first scenario, we adjust our assumptions about household and business borrowing to align our projections for GDP growth with the CBO's.
The results of our simulation are reported in Figure 4 .
The government deficit falls rapidly, but if we want to achieve the CBO's projected growth path, the private sector has to start borrowing again, switching to a deficit position. Under this scenario, we would return to a situation not so different from the one we had before the 2007-09 recession.
In Figure 5 we report the path of household and nonfinancial business debt, relative to GDP. Both of these sectors must become more indebted, given our scenario 1 assumptions. If this is the path the US economy takes, it will not be long before another crisis hits, if only because of heavy private sector indebtedness.
Scenario 2: A More Plausible Outcome
It must be said that in its January report, the CBO stresses the fact that much of the fiscal adjustment counted on in their baseline relies on temporary tax breaks not being renewed, which is somewhat unlikely. Moreover, there is no sign so far of an increase in private sector borrowing as sharp as the one we had to assume in scenario 1 in order to obtain the growth rates projected by the CBO.
We have therefore modified our assumptions, now assuming that tax rates remain at their current level, and that the deficit is reduced through spending cuts only. We also modify our assumptions on borrowing. Specifically, we assume that household borrowing increases very moderately during 2012, then stabilizes at a sustainable rate through the end of our simulation period.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 6 .
The government deficit declines only moderately. As a consequence, GDP grows by 2.7 percent in 2012, and manages to grow 1.9 percent in 2013, as compared to 1 percent in scenario 1.
With household borrowing so low, however, growth remains at only about 2 percent per year, which is not fast enough to reduce the unemployment rate. In this scenario, household 
Fundamental Problems with the CBO Model
The two scenarios discussed above involve either insufficient rates of economic growth or an excessive buildup of private sector debt, or both. Having shown in these scenarios that the situation will not improve as easily or as quickly as suggested by the CBO, we would like to mention some respects in which the CBO macro model is flawed.
The January CBO report referred to above contains some signs of faulty thinking. On the one hand, they state that "[from 2018] through 2022, CBO's economic projection is based on the assumption that real GDP will grow at its potential rate because the agency does not attempt to predict the timing or magnitude of fluctuations in the business cycle so far into the future" (CBO 2012, 25) They go on to state, "The projected impact on GDP in later years reflects two opposing forces. The lower marginal tax rates under those alternative assumptions would increase people's incentives to work and save, but the larger budget deficits would reduce (or "crowd out") private investment in productive capital" (29).
In other words, the CBO model is still based on theoretical assumptions that have been proven wrong by the spectacular failure of mainstream models to predict the last recession: (1) that output is driven by supply-side forces, such as incentives in the tax code to supply labor; and (2) that a government deficit only crowds out private investment, as long as the economy is growing fast enough to attain so-called "potential" levels of output, at which point the economy falls far short of full employment.
These flaws help explain why the CBO model yields optimistic forecasts for private sector recovery in the absence of increased levels of economic stimulus. Moreover, in general, policies based on a model such as the CBO's tend to undershoot sought-after growth rates, as shown by the results of our first two scenarios.
In addition, CBO optimism is based, at least in part, on the projection of a very low inflation rate of 1 percent and rising real wages. It is hard to believe that these projections will be plausible, unless the dynamics of the price of oil change dramatically.
Scenario 3: The Effects of a Small Fiscal Stimulus
We now turn to a realistic public-spending plan and its likely effects on the results reported above. Much research in recent years suggests that fiscal stimulus has worked in the past and that a given amount of stimulus is likely to have larger effects than the naysayers believe, especially when key short-term interest rates have reached approximately zero percent (Stehn 2012) .
In Figure 7 , we notice that government investmentespecially defense procurement-increased during the 2007-09 recession but is now back to its prerecession level as a share of GDP. Therefore, an increase of about 1 percent of GDP seems reasonably small, yet capable of lowering unemployment. 
Some Macroeconomic Policy Items on the Agenda for the Next Year
In a slowly growing world economy, aggressive efforts to expand exports amount to a "beggar thy neighbor" approach to restoring growth that seems counterproductive from the standpoint of the world as a whole (Robinson 1980, 29; Rodrik 2012 ).
Hence, for our concluding list of policy proposals we look mostly to public sector stimulus, though we also have some proposals in the way of stimuli to private sector job creation and investment. Also, we venture into some related policy areas that, in our view, offer hope for employment and output growth.
Of course, an obvious implication of the arguments and results above is that we still need a large increase in federal stimulus spending. The elements of a good stimulus agenda would include help for state and local governments, a renewal of the 2011 payroll tax cut, incentives for private sector job creation, and an extension of unemployment benefits. Moreover, with numerous highly skilled people out of work and with capital cheap, now is also the time to invest in long-run initiatives such as infrastructure improvement.
During the current presidential campaign, attention in the economic debate has focused on reforming the federal tax code or cutting taxes as a way of spurring private sector growth.
As usual, supply-side economics has been cited in recent weeks in support of the need to encourage business investment by reducing and/or reforming corporate taxes. All of the key reform proposals, including President Obama's framework, begin with a substantial cut in the statutory tax rate for corporations.
The supply-siders have made many exaggerated and/or dubious claims to the effect that almost everything hinges on tax incentives for businesses. It is important to evaluate the claim that efforts to cut corporate taxes in particular are needed at this point, especially since pressure is high to reduce the deficit either by raising taxes or by cutting spending-changes that would carry rather large economic and social costs in many cases.
One point to be made in this regard is that cash is now rather notoriously abundant on corporate balance sheets, leading to concerns that these funds are not being deployed for new business investment or to retain employees (Schwartz 2011 Corporate tax loopholes bring up fairness and efficiency issues that are also crucial to the national debate. The need to make the income distribution more fair has already been mentioned as a key impediment to continuing growth.
Congressional leaders and presidential candidates speak of closing loopholes and eliminating "preferences" in the tax code that lower rates for certain industries and kinds of income. This would lead to a trade of lower overall rates for fewer loopholes and a greater uniformity of rates across tax returns. Potentially, a major overhaul of this type could result in a tax code that was more equitable and provided more incentives for business investment.
On the other hand, as the debate over a new reform effort takes shape, some people are hoping that any final bill will be revenue neutral or revenue increasing overall. We, too, are concerned about the equity issues raised by reform advocates, but we worry that arguments over the reform agenda will divert Congress's attention from the need for more realistic and timely tax-incentive legislation that could spur job creation over the relatively short time horizon used in the sce- As for the weakness of efforts to stabilize the financial system, also on our list of slow-moving economic threats, tougher, more thoroughgoing approaches do exist: for example, Amar Bhidé's (2012) proposal for a commercial banking system made up of "boring banks"-safe banks with no shadow banking system of risk-taking ventures and institutions-and the new regulatory paradigm outlined by Jan Kregel (2010) in a recent Levy Institute brief. These ideas are broad proposals rather than à la carte items. Hence, they could form appealing and coherent visions for those who worry about weaknesses in a multifaceted reform effort.
Conclusion
Our three scenarios show that no matter how these policy issues are resolved in the next congressional session, the nation is still likely to be producing at far below its potential output levels when that session begins next January. Moreover, it is very unlikely that unemployment and underemployment will have reached even moderately elevated levels-say, an official unemployment rate of 6 percent. In fact, scenarios 1 of 1 percent. Figure 9 depicts the paths of unemployment achieved under each of the three scenarios. Based on our results, we surmise that it would take a much more substantial increase in fiscal stimulus to reduce unemployment to a level that most policymakers would regard as acceptable. 
